
Many scholars have likened Latin America’s neoliberal era in the late twentieth century to a second Great Transformation, an attempt to reduce politics and society as much as possible to expressions of free market economic rationality. Restructuring affected virtually every aspect of society, and research generally examined its effects on democratic stability, party systems, economic development models, new and old social movements, and poverty and inequality. The popular sectors, by comparison, received less systematic attention, especially with respect to larger national-level questions about their organization and connection to politics. The general consensus apparently was that the torrent of neoliberal reforms swept the old forms away, their remnants never to rearticulate. In the crush of rapid economic, political, and social change, the literature on popular sectors turned to studies of resistance by individual social movements, especially indigenous people, urban squatters, landless peasants, and (still) struggling labor movements.

Given this fragmented landscape, we know comparatively little about the popular sectors’ reconfiguration for political representation as a whole. Indeed, the crucial subject of interest intermediation regimes in democracies has for too long lain dormant. Cycles of mass mobilization, calls for participatory democracy, and renewed concern over economic growth with social equity urgently raise the question of how the popular sectors represent their interests beyond electoral politics and how they connect to the state.

*Reorganizing Popular Politics* goes a long way toward filling this significant gap in the literature on Latin American politics in the post–Washington Consensus era. This welcome volume is the most ambitious and systematic work to date on individual participation, associational activity, and new forms of political representation among the popular sectors in Latin America. General editors Ruth Berins Collier and Samuel Handlin define the popular sectors to encompass heterogeneous lower-class urban social sectors and the lower middle classes. Thus, they include formal and informal sector workers, the unemployed, and persons with a precarious hold on middle-class status.
The term popular sector interest regimes refers to the system of representation of popular sector interests beyond electoral politics, as well as their connection to the state. The “political” refers not only to state-directed action but also to self-help efforts, such as the provision of essential services. Questions of representativeness, accountability, organizational channels, and effectiveness in advocating popular sector demands drive the study. A rich empirical data set, drawn from rigorous surveys carried out in the capital cities of Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, supports the analysis and arguments of the book.

In well-crafted and nuanced chapters, Thad Dunning and Jason Seawright address individual participation in the interest arena. They examine “the types of activities individuals undertake to address both individual and collective problems, and how associational participation fits into the larger problem-solving repertoire of the popular sectors” (37). The contributions by Diana Kapiszewski, Handlin, and Candelaria Garay offer outstanding analyses of the emerging multifaceted popular sector interest regime itself. Unfortunately, space limitations by and large force me to fold their insights into the general discussion of the volume.

Collier and Handlin forcefully argue that a historic shift has occurred in popular sector interest intermediation regimes. Market reforms combined with liberal democracies eroded the union-party–affiliated and state corporatist regime of the 1930s to 1980s and replaced it with an emerging regime based on associational networks and neopluralism. Students of Latin American politics will find themselves on familiar ground with the characterization of the union-party nexus, a characterization to which Collier herself has contributed in past work. The state solved collective action problems (who organizes) by recognizing unions; unions, coordinated into federations, represented popular sector interests; access to the state occurred primarily at the national level through political parties; the autonomy of unions was compromised by detailed state regulation and party affiliation.

Associational networks, by contrast, structure the interaction between civil society and the state very differently. The retreat of the state from civil society during the neoliberal era opened opportunities for “spontaneous” organizing among the popular sectors around a much greater diversity of claims. Unlike the union-party–based network of the past, the new associations aggregate smaller numbers of persons and are generally less coordinated. Decentralization of central state responsibilities to municipalities—and the self-help orientation of many of the associations—has contributed to a pattern in which access to government in the new popular sector interest regime is primarily at the local level, and parties play a smaller role. Given the absence (or weakness) of ties to political parties or the state, associations are more
autonomous. However, the fact that many specialize in providing state services may create new forms of dependence.

The experience of neoliberalism over the past 25 years or so accustomed us to think of it as an atomizing agent; the market promotes radical individualism and poses significant obstacles to collective action, especially among the popular sectors. Both supporters and detractors of free market reforms in the context of liberal democracy saw this as a central characteristic. Reorganizing Popular Politics pulls back the curtain on these deeply ingrained habits of mind to reveal that although associational networks are less coordinated than the union-party hub was, they have more connections among each other than previously thought.

What forms do these connections among networks take? The book identifies two types of coordinating organizations: nodal NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and flexible fronts. Nodal NGOs are networks in which smaller, weaker self-help associations organize around more institutionalized government service–providing NGOs. These NGOs have more organizational capacity, possess permanent technical staff, keep in contact with government agencies, and, obviously, command resources that they distribute. Nodal NGOs may network among each other, too. Even though nodal NGOs are frequently government contractors and therefore somewhat dependent on the state, they also channel concerns, demands, and grievances from the bottom up to the authorities. Even more surprising, perhaps, is that although they prefer “insider” tactics of negotiation, they may occasionally initiate, lead, or participate in protests.

Flexible fronts, by comparison, are networks, federations, or coordinating committees formed among generally less institutionalized associations in civil society. Participating associations have fewer material resources and few paid staff. They are more democratic and participatory in their decisionmaking style than nodal NGOs or unions. Flexible fronts lack strong programmatic orientation. They function much more as spaces that facilitate interaction among associations. These fronts are flexible in membership (they may even include unions, usually of a newer, more dissident type), coalitional practices, and goals. They may seek to engage authorities but are much more likely to confront them through protest than nodal NGOs.

The editors conclude with strong, well-supported statements about major differences between the old union-party–hub popular sector interest regime and an emerging regime based on associational networks. They argue that associational networks offer a more genuine representation of popular sector interests but that their connection to the state, especially to the national state, is weaker. Therefore their policy impact at the national level is less significant than under the union hub of yore.
Reorganizing Popular Politics has all the qualities necessary for a seminal volume. It addresses significant and overlooked questions for democratic politics: how the popular sectors organize to represent their interests outside of electoral politics, and the roles they play as self-regarding agents in processes of socioeconomic and political change. Establishing the popular sectors as actors in their own right is critical to counteract technocratic, top-down, paternalistic policy debates, which assume that societies can achieve social equity largely by applying correct, enlightened policies.

The editors rightly point out that mapping the contours of popular sector representation—the major contribution of this volume—is a critical first step before other pressing questions can be investigated. Under what conditions might the popular sectors affect national policymaking? How do they influence the policy process and policy outcomes? These questions would require further research into the question of neoplueralism: who has access to policymaking and under what conditions. The role of unions in the process certainly merits further work, especially since the volume finds that associational networks with ties to unions have a higher rate of success in accessing national politics. Last but not least, the book is an invitation to extend the research to other cases and to probe the validity of its findings.

This book should be widely read and discussed. Anyone who does so will be roused to think more deeply about the sources of popular sector political representation after the Washington Consensus. The volume’s broad scope, scholarly precision, and rich material should stimulate those working on the subject to strengthen their research questions and inspire them to formulate new ones.

Eduardo Silva
Tulane University


Jean Grugel and Pía Riggiorozzi have collected a diverse set of regional and thematic studies to illuminate the nature of Latin American governance in the new millennium. As shorthand for the international and regional context of contemporary political and economic challenges, the authors choose the phrase after neoliberalism, referring at once to alternatives to structural adjustment policies and to the crisis that has shaken the international system. Most of the essays were completed before the international financial crisis of 2008, but they are prescient in characterizing Latin American governments searching for economic alternatives and political coalitions to support alternatives to waning U.S. dominance.
An introductory chapter by the editors lays out the core questions guiding the country studies.

The extent to which genuinely new and alternative models of governance are emerging in Latin America with respect to those framed under neoliberalism. . . . Is change confined to simply a new set of strategies for economic growth—or can we also identify a fresh engagement with democracy, inclusion, social policy, and even a new articulation of regionalism? (3)

This chapter also presents the challenge of the book, which is to distinguish the neoliberal project of national politics and international integration from leftist alternatives. The authors reject the simplistic characterization of a social democratic left and a populist left, preferring instead to note the core attributes of postneoliberal governance. These include policy that accepts the market but preserves a role for the state; a social coalition including the poor, the working class, and urban middle classes; and a state-building project to coordinate regional integration and international insertion (17–20). Based on these commonalities, the country studies display the coherence of these three attributes for contemporary Latin American leftist governments, but note the range of variation around these themes in individual countries.

Rosalía Cortés explores social policy in the region, concentrating on social security and labor law reforms. She notes the efforts of neoliberal governments to make inroads in existing social policies, generally lowering spending and removing the safety nets that were introduced during import substitution industrialization experiments after World War II. While the degree of neoliberal reform varied, Cortés notes a diffusion of targeted social programs and a pattern of administration that channeled resources through the nongovernmental sector.

In addition to placing civil society in the position of mediating between communities and state officials, the general impact was increased poverty and inequality. With the emergence of leftist governments, Cortés notes an expansion of social programs in terms of coverage and resources, but still the “cash transfer program remains the paradigm of social policy in Latin America, despite the demise of the Washington Consensus” (63). These programs continue to leave out certain portions of the poor, run the risk of co-opting civil society organizations, and potentially introduce clientelism in the discretionary allocation of benefits or political pressure for preferential access. Cortés traces the preference for these programs to the continued commitment to fiscal equilibrium, as these programs are extremely cheap, but effective, mechanisms to assist the poorest in getting out of poverty.

Diana Tussie frames governance in the region in terms of alternative economic integration projects. The left is new, she argues, pursuing
“policies that emphasize local responses to cover social deficits, but that remain fiscally responsible . . . and [show] the electorate that, in fact, the left might be both more socially sensitive and more economically responsible than its predecessors” (71). Her analysis makes its strongest contribution in contrasting regional integration projects. The first such project was the U.S.-sponsored Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA), essentially seeking to lock in neoliberal policies through international agreements, such as NAFTA and its Central American counterpart, CAFTA, adopting a pattern of open regionalism defined by the free movement of capital and goods.

Though some of the FTAA architecture remains, that project has largely been aborted, due to regional alternatives that share a mix of “challenge, sidelining, and resistance to the hegemony of American interests” (81). Mercosur provides an alternative pattern of regional integration, which is championed by Brazil and Argentina, while the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) offers a Venezuelan alternative directly opposed to the FTAA’s open regionalism. ALBA features a more explicit social orientation, including a compensatory fund for aid to vulnerable countries, something completely off the FTAA agenda. These economic integration projects have been complemented by additional political projects, such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), as well as development projects, such as the Banco del Sur.

The next chapter addresses Argentine governance since 2002. Riggirozzi characterizes economic policy during that time as “open-economy nationalism,” identified by export-led growth and open markets combined with nationalist rhetoric that recalls the welfare state and industrialization of the import substitution 1940s. Indeed, Riggirozzi suggests that the same polarity exists today, between a nationalist bourgeois and labor coalition and a liberal coalition of agrarian and transnational interests and their foreign capital allies.

The crisis of 2001 signaled the collapse of the neoliberal governance model, which Riggirozzi characterizes as a demobilization of the citizenry, concentration of power in the executive, and a weakening of the state. In its place, the Kirchner and Fernández de Kirchner governments increased popular organization, reasserted state authority, and pursued export expansion and a renewal of industrial activity. This was supported by decisive social programs to ameliorate the worst costs of the crisis.

Riggirozzi highlights the ideological role of nationalism in both governments as the glue that held together popular, political elite, and capitalist compromise. The main difference from prior periods was that “contemporary nationalism is presented as compatible with market rules” (106). In part, this was fortuitous because the new regime gov-
erned at a moment of high international prices for Argentine primary exports, but also because of the favorable renegotiation and cancellation of debts with internal and external creditors. While Riggirozzi notes the significant changes in economic strategy, she emphasizes the continuity from the Menem government, in which power was significantly centralized in the hands of the executive.

The penultimate chapter, by Sean W. Burges, explores Brazil’s “neoliberal democracy” and suggests that Brazil has transited smoothly from Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s center-right government to Lula’s center-left government with only cosmetic changes in appeals to particular political bases. Burges rests his argument on the claim that “neoliberalism or liberal economics [has] not been a failure in Brazil” (195), but Brazilian neoliberalism is homegrown, in which “liberal economic reform . . . has been an integral part of a long-term program of sociopolitical change accepted by vast swathes of the Brazilian political landscape” (196).

Burges correctly notes that neoliberalism in Brazil adapted to and forced adaptations in political institutions and social coalitions. He observes that both Lula and Cardoso built political support bases among the informal sector and the poorest citizens. The root of Cardoso’s appeal to these sectors was the defeat of inflation, which had eroded their incomes so severely that they were willing to forgive the economic slowdown that characterized the Cardoso years. With their support, Cardoso could pursue reforms, such as privatization and spending restraint, which confronted organized workers and the public sector while benefiting financial elites and transnational capital.

Lula built his support base in a slightly different fashion. Unlike Cardoso’s term, the Lula years were characterized by relatively high growth, at least after 2005. This growth provided resources to expand greatly the income transfers and minimum wage increases that became the chief source of allegiance from working classes. Lula could also offer organized workers a halt to privatizations, an expansion of the public sector, and loosened credit, greatly increasing middle-class consumption and the size of the domestic market. Yet the core macroeconomic stabilization strategy remained preserving the support of privileged classes, especially exporters, who were encouraged by an aggressive incentive program, as well as an increase in the price of Brazilian commodities. In short, while Cardoso adapted his support base to the necessities of economic reform, Lula apparently adapted economic reform to the necessities of his support base.

As with all collections, the arguments and conclusions vary somewhat across chapters, especially those that deal with country cases. As an attempt to tie the chapters together, the conclusion refers to Polanyi’s concept of a double movement, in which marketization is always met by
efforts to re-embed markets in societal values and institutions. This framework could have greatly improved individual chapters, spelling out the implication that differences among national leftist responses can be traced to the intensity of neoliberal reforms. Yet this logic is somewhat unsatisfactory, as the authors note that postneoliberal governance remains hamstrung by fiscal constraints, and efforts at amelioration through conditional cash transfer programs are always less than satisfactory.

In other words, while neoliberalism has clearly lost its discursive appeal in the region, a clear alternative has not yet been consolidated. Indeed, there is increasing evidence, even under the leftist governments that now populate the region, that popular movements are no longer satisfied by a discourse that rejects neoliberal theory but fails to articulate an alternative.

Aaron Schneider
Tulane University


Leonardo Avritzer has, in recent years, established himself as one of the most prominent and most distinctive voices in political science in Latin America. In a time when political science, in Brazil anyway, has acquired a decided preference for complex techniques (and many political scientists have come to define themselves by the English term *hard*, as in *hard science*), Avritzer’s commitment to theory, and democratic theory in particular, as the lens through which to interpret the reality around him makes him at least unusual. At a time when so much of political science about Brazil seems to be about free rider dilemmas, pork politics, and federative arrangements (in other words, about the nasty, brutish, and unchanging nature of Brazilian politics), reading Avritzer on publics, normative commitments, and institutional designs of participatory settings can be liberating in the way it opens up the vistas of the possible. Or at the very least, it shows how nastiness might come under other, more positive influences.

A graduate of the New School in 1993, its heyday of civil society discussion, Avritzer was then one of a number of scholars from abroad, like Alberto Olvera, Aldo Panfichi, and Enrique Peruzzotti, whose Ph.D. dissertations stretched the democratic problematic to “other contexts.” One way to understand Avritzer’s trajectory is to think of a series of interventions that have continually pushed the boundaries of that original discussion, first theoretically in *A moralidade da democracia* (1996) and then subsequently in a series of works that have connected nor-
mative democratic theory with theories of democratization (or rather, shown their disconnect). These include Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America (2002) and an extensive series of empirical investigations on actually existing civil society, principally in Brazil. Part of the excitement in his writing comes from its context; postauthoritarian Brazil is an exciting place to think about democracy and, in particular, democratic innovation. Brazil has been home to celebrated experiments and experiences in democracy, from participatory budgets to health councils and more.

Avritzer’s most recent book, Participatory Institutions in Democratic Brazil, takes stock of these innovations and the debate about them, and along the way makes important interventions. It returns to some familiar terrain for his readers, but opens up new lines of investigation, too. It is the most empirical of his books, the fruit of several investigations carried out by the Centro in Belo Horizonte, so those hoping for more of the concept stretching that defined some of his earlier works will find fewer pages dedicated to that. On the other hand, the discussion here is really anchored in empirical studies and is more concerned with outcomes than much of the discussion on participation. Much like his 2002 book, this book will help set the agenda for the next discussions on participation.

Avritzer, who in the past has argued against what he saw as the overemphasis on institutional design features by some analysts, in this book explores interactions between design features, civil society, and political contexts. One of the book’s punch lines, that context matters and that participation will not work the same everywhere, has been prefigured in his other work and is now part of scholarly common sense anyway. But part of what is really novel here is that he makes specific arguments about what will and will not work in particular contexts as he explores combinations of interactions. One of the brilliant insights here is to study the different kinds of institutions in comparison with one another in a particular context.

The book examines three types of participatory institutions, participatory budgets, health councils, and city master plans, across four large cities in Brazil: São Paulo, Salvador, Recife, and Porto Alegre. Each of the participatory institutions has distinct design features. Participatory budgets are bottom-up and most participatory but most dependent on a favorable context. Health councils are “power-sharing arrangements” that are less participatory but also less dependent on the will of political actors. Master plans are about “ratification” designs, in which the state maintains policymaking prerogatives but policies are ratified in public, open assemblies. These then play out in cities that range from the most favorable context, those with mobilized civil societies and favorable political contexts (Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte), to the less
favorable, a city with an uneven civil society and a less favorable political context (São Paulo) and a city with the least favorable context, Salvador, with a demobilized civil society and an antagonistic political context. Perhaps not surprisingly, in the two most favorable cities, all three kinds of participatory institutions work, while in the middle case, “power sharing” and “ratification” kinds of institutions work, and in the least favorable case, only “ratification” works.

Much as the book sets an important corrective and helps frame the next set of discussions about participatory democracy in Brazil, it also raises questions for further discussion. The first is whether the attention to “successes” and “failures” of particular institutions sacrifices attention to the processes of implementation, adaptation, and negotiation that led to those outcomes. In other words, the understanding that for participatory budgeting to succeed, a consensus or near-consensus in political society is necessary alongside a mobilized civil society is almost a circular argument, and tends to obscure the controversies and failures that went into those successes. It could be argued that mobilized civil society and the willingness of political society are as much outcomes of the successes as conditions for them.

A second question the book raises is the context of the production and authorship of scholarship on participation. In a bit of a rhetorical flourish, Avritzer declares himself beyond the “triumphalist phase” of participatory studies in Brazil. One objection, of course, is that the cited authors of said phase (including this one) also understood themselves to be beyond triumphalism, and none quite fit the characteristics of the description Avritzer provides. But more to the point, the move beyond it is not purely internal to the logic of argumentation. Instead, the “triumphalism” was very much a product of its time, a time of enchantment with democratic possibilities and with the Workers’ Party, just as the current book is a product of a later, soberer time after years of more ambiguous combinations of accomplishment and disappointment with the Lula national administration. In this context, Avritzer’s book does have a measure of triumphalism, as it has lost none of the hopefulness about participation’s transformative potential that drove his earlier work.

Gianpaolo Baiocchi
Brown University


The 2006 electoral victory of Presidenta Michelle Bachelet—victim of the dictatorship, single mother, and political outsider—was a first in
Chile’s postauthoritarian political context, where continuity in lieu of change has consistently been a successful strategy. Although the beginnings of her presidency were marked by frequent attacks on her alleged indecisiveness and ineffectiveness, the end of her term was characterized by widespread support for both her persona and her presidency.

This book brings together an impressive set of scholars on Chile, each contributing a chapter that examines the performance of Bachelet’s government in a specific area of policymaking or politics in which they have extensive expertise, highlighting the sometimes deleterious side effects of the Concertación’s commitment to broad-based consensus. While Chile’s political elites have tended to view conflict and consensus as a trade-off, the editors of this volume argue that during Bachelet’s presidency, the search for consensus had the paradoxical effect of increasing conflict. The book, which was written and published before the end of Bachelet’s term, functions like a midterm performance evaluation, providing a comprehensive and thoughtful examination of the first half of her term but without delivering a long-lasting final verdict on her presidency.

As has been common in analyses of contemporary Chile, this book seems to center on a debate over whether the glass representing the Concertación’s achievements is half full or half empty, with the authors landing on different sides of this continuum. Each chapter presents an overview and analysis of a specific sector (civil-military relations, education, women’s rights, etc.) during the first two years of Bachelet’s presidency. Although the book sometimes becomes repetitive as each contribution reintroduces similar versions of the same conflict, these remain tied to a central theoretical cord and manage collectively to weave a coherent and compelling narrative of this period.

The authors all seem to share a generalized consensus on the contents of what they term the “politics of consensus,” but they differ in their assessments of how the catalysts and obstacles for change are constituted. They examine Bachelet’s difficult relationship with previous Concertación governments and reflect on whether Bachelet positioned herself as a torchbearer and heir of the coalition or as an agent of change (Robert L. Funk, 55). The chapters focus on the tension between the popular expectations created by Bachelet’s election and her relatively moderate policy platform; on the perhaps impossible commitment simultaneously to create a gobierno ciudadano, with high levels of responsiveness to mass demands, and to maintain gobernabilidad, understood by Chileans as the avoidance of conflict and appeasement of anxiety via commitment to pursue only limited and gradual change.

On consensus as an obstacle to substantial change, Borzutzky claims that Bachelet’s promise to tame the market remained unfulfilled. In an overview of socioeconomic policies during this period, she argues
that in spite of the equity-inducing potential of some policy aspects, such as the pension reform and increased spending on health, the president’s efforts were limited by the politics of consensus. For Eduardo Silva and Patricio Rodrigo, the barrier to change is issue-specific: environmental and indigenous peoples’ demands that are innately incompatible with the consensus to maintain the neoliberal structure installed by the dictator Augusto Pinochet. Weeks argues that civilians and the military do not really have a shared understanding of the meaning of the democratic transition. However, there is a facade of consensus on postauthoritarian civil-military relations, which stymies the deeper democratization of that relationship. In spite of Bachelet’s good relations with the military, the lack of consensus on the meaning and timing of the democratic transition translated into a lack of force to enact reforms.

While all the authors coalesce around Bachelet’s “good intentions” (Aldo Vacs, 216), the narratives differ in the amount of agency Bachelet is thought to have exerted, as well as in the relative weight of bottom-up protest groups as catalysts for change. In both Kirsten Sehnbruch’s analysis of labor and Mary Rose Kubal’s of education, a series of popular protests won these issues a prominent (and unplanned) position on the government agenda. According to Sehnbruch, the 2007 labor protests were a product of both the dissonance between Bachelet’s image as a reformer and her moderate policy platform, and the perception and reality of precariousness in Chile’s neoliberal job market. However, the impetus to break the political impasse on the minimum wage front was neither the strength of protest movements nor a presidential intervention but an external push, the timely intervention from an archbishop on what he called the ethical wage (147).

Although labor issues are an area in which the Concertación failed to produce substantial equity-enhancing reforms, Sehnbruch’s chapter is written in a hopeful tone, emphasizing symbolic issues, such as the title of the 2007 commission tasked with finding a new consensus on labor issues (147), the revival of intercompany collective bargaining, and the emergence of subcontracted workers as political actors, along with the (somewhat paltry) material gains achieved.

Analogously, in Kubal’s analysis, it is due to the efforts of the student movement (affectionately termed the Penguin revolution) that education issues become the top area Bachelet’s regime had to contend with as she came into power. However, unlike the issues in the chapters written by Funk, Sehnbruch, and Peter M. Siavelis, the emergence of the Penguin revolution did not respond to expectations created by Bachelet’s image as a proponent of reform, but can be thought of primarily as a product of a long-term and slow-moving cumulative cause—the persistence of a decentralized, market-anchored education system that reproduces and deepens existing inequalities. In Kubal’s view, the
emergence of the Penguin movement was both inevitable and independent of 2006 electoral outcomes. From this perspective, there is an underlying sense throughout her chapter of Bachelet being trapped by the circumstances under which and into which she came into power.

From a more agentic standpoint, in her analysis of gender policies, Susan Franceschet argues that the effects of the political practice of consensus were not homogenous, but posed varying levels of constraint, depending on issue-specific and institutional variables. In those cases where it was viable, Bachelet spearheaded significant changes. In situations where Congress was not a key actor, the president used her executive autonomy to promote reforms; for example, preventing violence against women. However, in those cases where issues are controversial, such as reproductive rights, the long-term effects of the president’s initiatives are as yet elusive.

The most significant aspects of Bachelet’s presidency, without doubt, are embodied in her persona, as a non-Catholic, mother of children from different relationships, daughter of a general who opposed the coup. Her personal biography strikes emotive chords among leftists, military members, and female-headed households, creating an image far closer and dearer to the majority of Chileans than those of previous Concertación politicians. Both Siavelis and Funk focus their contributions on Bachelet’s personal characteristics, arguing that those that made her a good candidate (a fresh face, a lack of traditional party ties, a consensual, inclusive style, a woman in a male-dominated political system) worked against her once in office, creating an inefficient government and decisionmaking style and a problematic composition and working of the cabinet. Funk’s chapter—which includes a preliminary examination of the second half of her term—explains that instead of becoming ensnared in her promised narrative of gobierno popular, in her second half-term President Bachelet was able to rebrand her personal narrative, shifting her focus from popular participation to a top-down concern for social protection.

For those of us who are specialists on Chile, the careful and comprehensive sector-by-sector analyses provided in this volume are gems, unique both as a unified narrative of Bachelet’s election and initial performance and in the expertise each author brings to her or his chapter. The use of consensus and conflict as analytical anchors from which to view postauthoritarian Chile is both innovative and coherent.

In spite of the generalized theme of “consensus on consensus” in contemporary Chile, this volume is innovative in thoroughly examining the contents of this idea as a theoretical construct and exploring its varied meanings from an intersectoral approach. However, in their enthusiasm about Bachelet’s tremendously exciting presidency, the authors were perhaps precipitous in drawing conclusions out of only
one-half of her (recently shortened) presidential term. The 2010 elections and earthquake ended Bachelet’s government as dramatically as it began, shaking Chile’s foundations and signaling the end of the Concertación’s stewardship over postauthoritarian Chile.

As of November 2010, it would seem that President Sebastián Piñera has learned the lessons of the Concertación well and has become exceptionally skillful at combining populist policies with the maintenance of elite rule and a probusiness agenda. However, there is no doubt that the government of Bachelet will have a long-lasting effect on Chile’s future, in symbolic terms as Chile’s first female president, in the continuation of a process of elite renewal, and in policy legacies. Paraphrasing Funk, while Michelle Bachelet was Chile’s first female president, we can be certain she will not be the last.

Jael Goldsmith Weil
Northwestern University


Since the 1990s, trends in social welfare retrenchment and the creation of targeted poverty alleviation programs have captured the attention of numerous scholars of Latin American politics. Michelle Dion’s book on the evolution of Mexico’s social welfare state provides a refreshing and much-needed perspective on recent developments in Mexico, as well as elsewhere in Latin America. Ambitious in its scope, *Workers and Welfare* examines the origins and historical development of Mexico’s welfare institutions over nearly a century.

Dion employs comparative historical analysis to answer several empirical puzzles about the politics of welfare provisions in Mexico. For instance, why would the country devote considerable economic and political resources to create welfare institutions that primarily benefited a small number of urban industrial workers when the nation was primarily agrarian in the 1940s? If, in Europe, the expansion of welfare at the turn of the century coincided with democratic consolidation and the extension of worker suffrage, why were Mexico’s welfare institutions consolidated during its most authoritarian period? Furthermore, if Mexico’s dominant party had complete control over organized labor, why was the regime unable to advance all the pension and health insurance reforms favored in the 1990s (2)? Dion rejects several alternative explanations, including economic functionalism and economic development, policy diffusion, state capacity, interest groups and pluralism, and constructions of gender. Instead, she employs a class-based approach,
along with power resource theory and historical institutionalism, to explain the development of welfare institutions.

Dion pays special attention to the role of organized workers and cross-class coalitions, much like class-based research on the evolution of European welfare states, such as Huber and Stephens’s *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State* (2001). The heart of her analysis is the role that class coalitions play in shaping new institutions and the process of change. At the same time, she also draws on previous historical institutionalist analysis that emphasizes how political conflict can shape political institutions (such as Kathleen Thelen, *How Institutions Evolve*, 2004).

Once created, welfare institutions take on a life of their own. These institutions create policy legacies or feedback effects that influence later prospects for collective action. In other words, welfare institutions create winners and losers with distributional consequences for further reforms. Dion argues that the propensity for either stability or change is driven by changes in political or economic institutions, which alter the balance of power among class actors that can destabilize previous cross-class coalitions (7).

The book provides a careful and detailed examination of the origins of Mexico’s welfare institutions, unions, and cross-class coalitions that support the ruling party. For practical purposes, Dion focuses her analysis on the evolution of social insurance (contributory) and noncontributory social assistance and leaves out other social policy areas that have some welfare features, such as education and public health. Her analysis is nonetheless expansive; it covers the creation of several institutions, such as the Government Workers’ Social Security and Services Institute (ISSSTE), the Mexican Institute of Social Insurance (IMSS), the National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL), PROGRESA, and Opportunities (*Oportunidades*). Thus, one of the key contributions of this book is its long-range view of the politics of welfare.

Most research on social welfare in Mexico has focused on a single policy domain (e.g., pension privatization, social assistance for the poor) or on a single welfare institution. By undertaking a broader perspective, Dion develops a fascinating account of the politics of institutional creation. Institutional layering—creating new institutions alongside old ones (38)—emerges as a key theme that helps explain politicians’ strategies, as well as the constraints that organized labor faces when pressing for its interests. Since the book’s argument differs from analyses that emphasize labor’s co-optation and acquiescence, especially after labor’s incorporation into national politics (e.g., Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, 1991), let us delve into the crux of her argument.

Whereas conventional accounts emphasize either narrow path dependency or labor’s co-optation by the ruling party through much of
the twentieth century, Dion asserts that shifting compositions of class coalitions were key to sustaining the authoritarian regime and that this helps explain welfare development. After the revolution, the government sought to extend social insurance for both private and public sectors. However, business leaders blocked the extension of social protections for their employees. While private sector workers waited, the Civil Pension Law (1925) provided coverage for some public sector workers. It would take nearly 20 years, however, for the Social Insurance Law (1943) to create the IMSS, because the regime needed to sustain political bargains and ensure support for the nationalization of oil.

From 1950 to 1970, Mexico expanded its social insurance through reforms and layering. According to Dion, public sector workers were essential for the maintenance of regime support. Public sector unions pressed for better access to and quality of services, and the government responded through the creation of ISSSTE (1960) to provide social security and services for public employees. Benefits for private sector workers also improved during this period, but it was politically infeasible to extend the same level of coverage to them.

The beginning of the welfare system's retrenchment dates back to the economic crisis of 1982 and nascent political competition. As the economic crisis threatened the PRI's legitimacy and undercut organized labor's political leverage, the Salinas and Zedillo administrations balanced new interests and relied on new cross-class coalitions for PRI support. For instance, pension privatization was an important goal under Salinas, but so was NAFTA. To secure labor's support for NAFTA, his administration tempered privatization efforts and instead introduced an individual retirement savings (SAR) system as an iterative step toward privatization. Zedillo would have to take up pension privatization of IMSS later. Over time, economic liberalization eroded the influence of organized trade sectors and produced a large group of urban and rural poor. Political competition also shifted the PRI's focus from maintaining sectoral support to building territorial support in an effort to capture swing voters.

Dion develops a time series analysis in chapter 6 to test the validity of her historical qualitative argument. While controlling for key economic factors, she demonstrates the independent effect of labor mobilization from 1944 to 1999. Although her proxy for labor mobilization (strike petitions) cannot capture the nuances of sectoral influence of different labor unions, the statistical evidence does illustrate the relative strength of organized labor under different economic development models.

Welfare reforms have continued since Mexico's historic election of Vicente Fox (PAN) and subsequent election of Felipe Calderón (PAN). Dion offers two chapters on this relatively short period and provides
nuanced analysis on the effects of neoliberalism and democratization on welfare reform. For instance, she details the Fox administration's retrenchment and reform efforts with the IMSS pension system and Calderón's successful integral reforms of the ISSSTE. Why would democracy and electoral competition undermine worker interests during this period? Here Dion returns to the role of worker mobilization and argues that public workers found their influence declining. While Fox legalized the creation of a second government workers' federation, some rank-and-file members sought reforms of their own—to reform their own organizations or to establish independence from the PRI. Divided government under Fox initially helped government worker unions block retrenchment efforts, but Calderón craftily used union rivalry to gain support for his reforms. It is interesting that electoral competition would only ensure that popular and relatively inexpensive noncontributory, or targeted, welfare benefits would continue (PRONASOL under Salinas, then PROGRESA under Zedillo, renamed Opportunities under Fox).

Given the book's ambitious scope, it is hard to lament that it does not cover even more policy issues. Yet public health is one arena that could be addressed more frontally. Dion's analysis of health care access and quality for workers covered under IMSS and ISSSTE raises questions about the relationship between social insurance and public health provision. Given the political synergies between social insurance, health care access and insurance, and requirements that Opportunities beneficiaries meet health care criteria, Dion's theoretical framework could be extended to examine the development of public health. How might class and organized labor interests, especially doctors' and nurses' organizations, shape the development of the public health institutions? To what extent did public health also display features of institutional layering that were tied to the formation of social insurance institutions? Dion's theoretical framework might provide insights into not only a broader analysis of health care but also other social policy domains.

Overall, *Workers and Welfare* provides a thorough, well-researched, and theoretically interesting account of the development of Mexico's social protection system since the 1920s. The author's use of mixed methods—detailed archival research, interviews, and statistical analysis—demonstrates artful methodological sophistication. This book serves as a model for students of the benefits that multiple methods can bring to a single research project. It is also an essential read for scholars of Mexican politics and contemporary social policy in Latin America.

Natasha Borges Sugiyama
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
This book is a thought-provoking intervention in the historical debates on political participation, protest, and violence in the Peruvian sierra throughout the twentieth century. It addresses two questions: Which historical factors underlie the emergence of the violent Shining Path insurgency (1980–92) in rural Ayacucho in the 1970s and 1980s? What explains the local variations in support for the Shining Path? Heilman answers both questions by delving into the historical trajectory of local, regional, and national politics in the districts of Carhuanca and Luricocha:

“This book asserts that, by looking at the long historical course of political engagement inside communities, we can contextualize a devastating war that might otherwise seem utterly incomprehensible” (8). Her research combines rigorous archival investigation of judicial and bureaucratic documentation with oral histories that shed light on the patterns of conflict through memory narratives of the district residents.

Heilman argues that the Shining Path was the “last and most extreme of a series of radical political movements that garnered strength in Peru’s countryside during the twentieth century” (2). The struggle for access to basic resources and capabilities (chief among them literacy), legal protection, and inclusion into party politics left a legacy of frustration with state institutions, which the violent insurgency used to destroy the state altogether. The mixture of malign neglect and indiscriminate repression, which characterized the Peruvian state’s engagement with rural communities throughout the twentieth century, created the social conditions under which the Shining Path leadership recruited a new cadre of local elites, mostly provincial teachers and students, by employing a rhetoric of social justice and revolution. However, Heilman—along with a number of other scholars and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report—notes that the insurgency reproduced “many of the race and class hatreds that their People’s War aimed to defeat” (3), which ultimately led to the erosion of its support base.

The book moves beyond the broad-brush treatment of this political history. Its strength lies in the careful tracing of the century-long political processes that produced divergent outcomes in two districts. Carhuanca, a rural community of small landholders, disconnected from urban markets and administrative centers, suffered the effects of abandonment. Local politics in the early twentieth century often took the form of abusive land expropriation through violence and predatory litigation practices. When the left-populist American Revolutionary Popular Alliance (APRA) introduced national party politics in the region, the poorest and most vulnerable peasants enthusiastically joined to end arbitrary rule by local notables.
But Carhuanquinos experienced disillusionment as successive efforts by APRA, the centrist Acción Popular party, and the reformist military government failed to secure the poor residents’ access to basic resources and eliminate the relations of domination in the community. Every project aimed to improve well-being, be it the construction of a highway, a school, or the implementation of land reform, forced the poorest Carhuanquinos to make major sacrifices (such as providing unpaid labor), while they did not receive the benefits. As the progressive phase of the military government came to an end in 1975, frustrated Carhuanquinos began to join the ranks of Shining Path, this time not only to remove and prosecute abusive local notables but to physically eliminate them. The national government’s policy of abandonment facilitated insurgent action even further, as the civil guard abandoned the district as early as 1978.

The historical trajectory was quite dissimilar in Luricocha, a community near the urban center of Huanta, and one dominated by powerful hacendados. The rupture that set Luricocha’s history apart from Carhuancas took place as early as 1896, when the government, fearing the specter of an indigenous revolt, massacred protesting peasants in Huanta. The acts of atrocity, with strong racist and class-based overtones, haunted the collective memory of Luricochanos, who distanced themselves from militant activism during the first half of the twentieth century. Even when the indigenous Tawantinsuyo movement swept parts of rural Ayacucho in the 1920s, the Luricocha peasantry remained, by and large, apathetic. Instead, the powerful hacendados took center stage in mobilizing local politics in the name of national political movements.

A counterintuitive finding in the book suggests that Luricocha’s economic elites, despite their class position in regard to the poor peasantry, took active roles in leftist parties. As politics remained an elite endeavor in the district throughout the twentieth century, the Shining Path found it extremely difficult to recruit among the peasantry in Luricocha—a surprising finding, considering that one of the top Shining Path leaders, Augusta La Torre, was a Luricochana, and the insurgency built a major training camp on one of the district’s haciendas.

Heilman’s analysis of the politics of literacy is one of the most fascinating discussions in the book. She argues that poor and disempowered peasants across rural Ayacucho, and especially in Carhuancas, have developed an ambiguous attitude toward literacy. On the one hand, this basic capability is valued as the sine qua non of legal protection and social mobility, which is why the quality of schools has played a central role in local politics. On the other hand, the power of literacy has been abused to such an extent that the illiterate tend to view the literate in a negative light. The word tinterillo (which literally means “men who use little inkwells”) refers to those literate individuals who
use the legal and political system for their personal benefit (96), and it figures frequently in the oral histories detailing relations of hierarchy inside Carhuancac.

Completely illegitimate lawsuits initiated by *tinterillos*, habitually drunk and violent school teachers, and lack of commitment on the part of the national government to universal literacy produce a social setting in which literacy appears as both emancipation and oppression. I would expand Heilman’s analysis further to suggest that all forms of social and political inclusion have brought up similar manifestations of this central ambiguity in rural Ayacucho: the positive project of allegiance to the state and its institutions as a means of empowerment and enfranchisement contrasted with the negative project of destroying these institutions and the state itself to break free of the bonds of oppression. The latter was attempted, without success, by the Shining Path.

A key weakness of the book, and one Heilman admits to, is that her rigorous research in Carhuancac is not matched by an equally detailed investigation in Luricocha. This leaves the reader wondering if some local processes that may have caused the outcomes of interest remain unidentified. Another major difficulty, shared by most path-dependent analyses in the social sciences, is the inability to show that past events continue to have strong effects in the present. For example, the withdrawal of the civil guard in 1978 seems to explain Shining Path’s early success in Carhuancac independently of the long history of abandonment in the district. I am not entirely convinced that the strategic withdrawal of police in a number of districts, not only in the historically abandoned ones, actually replicates the century-long trajectory of malign neglect.

Another difficulty in the book concerns the way Heilman treats the interviews and archival documents. In order to demonstrate the extent to which political authority is abused, she relies heavily on written and spoken complaints, but she offers no measure for evaluating whether the complaints result from actual acts of injustice or merely reflect a high degree of gossip and distrust in the communities. Some persons draw so much shared condemnation from the community that the reader is persuaded of their criminal acts; but in a political setting like Carhuancac, where two leading families constantly accuse one another of wrongdoing, the need to distinguish truth from lies becomes a pressing methodological need.

The confusion is alarming in one passage: “Though Primitivo Mayhua enjoyed impunity for his abuses, his abuses ultimately killed him” (113). The author explains that one of the people Mayhua wronged was a sorcerer, who cast a spell on him, and he “soon thereafter suffered a debilitating stroke” (113). I share the author’s sensitivity not to limit the domain of human knowledge to positivism, but claiming that Mayhua’s “abuses ultimately killed him” reflects something
other than epistemological open-mindedness; it shows that the author herself believes that the cause of death was sorcery in this case.

Despite these shortcomings, I highly recommend Heilman’s book for students and scholars of Peruvian history, peasant movements, and political violence, as well as practitioners of archival and ethnographic methodologies.

Onur Bakiner
Yale University


James McGuire breaks new ground by bridging the fields of political science, public health, and development studies. He asks a seemingly simple question: Why do some developing countries do better than others at reducing infant mortality figures? Here infant mortality stands in as a proxy for development, broadly defined as the expansion of human capabilities. Avoidance of early death is obviously a prerequisite to the development of capabilities. Infant mortality figures inform us about the degree to which a population’s basic needs for health care, nutrition, water, sanitation, and education are being met. McGuire uses quantitative and qualitative analysis to explore three sets of hypotheses—the first focused on economic growth, the second on public health care spending, the third on democracy—about what causes rapid infant mortality decline.

The first set of hypotheses is called the “wealthier is healthier” approach. It postulates that rapid growth in GDP per capita brings down infant mortality rates, especially when accompanied by low income inequality. The public health approach suggests that higher public spending on health care, along with the provision of basic social services, lowers infant mortality. The political science perspective expects positive associations between democracy, public health spending, and lowered infant mortality.

Using data on the rate and degree of change in infant mortality figures between 1960 and 2005 for 104 developing nations, McGuire finds that wealthier is indeed healthier. It’s just that the required acceleration in GDP per capita and shrinking of income inequality are well beyond feasible policy aims for most countries. A more feasible route to reducing infant mortality, according to this analysis, would be to effect change in variables more amenable to public policy, such as increasing the number of years of schooling for females and expanding the percentage of births attended by trained personnel.

Throughout the book, McGuire makes the point that these and other interventions, such as family planning programs, child immuniza-
tion campaigns, and improving water and sanitation, are relatively cheap, given their payoff in mortality declines. The statistical analysis also shows that while democracy is associated with the utilization of mortality-reducing social services, only long-term democracy is associated with lower infant mortality. McGuire admits that the magnitude and robustness of these associations are not as satisfying as we would want.

In the nested analysis pursued in this book, the large-N study found in chapter 2 is followed by eight country case studies, including Costa Rica, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. The thick description of these cases attempts to tease out the relationships described above and to illustrate them in historical context. The mix of Latin American and Asian cases also allows this book to contribute to the larger literature on development strategies in the two world regions.

McGuire begins each chapter by describing the country’s infant mortality figures for the common starting point (1960) and endpoint (2005). He summarizes the country’s performance in terms of the changes in its infant mortality levels and the tempo of those changes. In all cases, McGuire can identify decades of particularly rapid or slow progress. He also informs us at the beginning of each chapter whether the country performed better or worse in decreasing infant mortality than its GDP per capita economic growth figures would have predicted. Thus, in most cases, McGuire sets up a puzzle of superior or inferior performance to be explained by his review of related political and policy developments.

Perhaps the paradigmatic case of dramatic infant mortality reduction under democratic auspices is Costa Rica. Costa Rica did much better in reducing infant mortality than its GDP per capita growth alone would have predicted. This was due to the rapid expansion of basic services such as clean water, sanitation, and family planning, and particularly to a health promotion campaign targeted at the poorest rural (and later urban) dwellers in the 1970s. McGuire argues convincingly that electoral incentives partly explain the pro-poor health drive of the 1970s, when politicians had substantial incentives to woo rural voters. And in the late 1990s, grassroots voices successfully pressured health authorities to sustain the expansion of primary health care teams throughout several changes of administration.

Taiwan comes closest to being the “poster country” for the “wealthier is healthier” perspective. At the end of 2005, it had the highest GDP per capita and lowest income inequality of all the countries studied in the book. Taiwan had also experienced the fastest annual GDP per capita growth of the eight countries. This rapid socioeconomic modernization went a long way toward “naturally” reducing infant mortality via improvements in the standard of living, expanded education, and
declining fertility. But McGuire shows that targeted policy interventions also played a role in Taiwan’s success, especially inasmuch as public health services and disease control measures had already contributed to Taiwan’s relatively low infant mortality rate at the start of its economic take-off.

Other countries present messier but no less intriguing pictures. Particularly interesting is the relationship between shorter experiences with democracy (in all countries save Costa Rica) and interventions affecting infant mortality. The quality of those democracies, especially in terms of how access to basic public services has now come to be defined as a right of citizenship, ranges from the firmly entrenched in Chile and Brazil to the disappointing experience of Indonesia. In general, the country chapters are hugely ambitious and very informative, although their length and detail make for a challenging read.

Across the chapters, there are at least two counterintuitive findings. One is that some authoritarian governments did a darn good job of reducing infant mortality levels. Particularly noteworthy is the rapid drop in infant mortality during the first decade of General Pinochet’s military regime in Chile. While reducing the absolute level of public spending on health care, the Pinochet regime successfully targeted interventions to the poorest. It is not clear why the regime targeted infant mortality, but one of the explanations focuses on the dedication of an individual government technocrat, Miguel Kast (116). This is one of the few times we get a glimpse of what technocrats were thinking as they put successful policy interventions in motion. In general, the role of bureaucratic initiative in formulating, lobbying for, and implementing the relevant public health interventions is underexplored. More information about the policy decision process would shed greater light on what motivated reformers and how they dealt with the inevitable obstacles to their plans.

Another counterintuitive conclusion that spans most countries is that the expansion of formal health insurance schemes had very little to do with the reduction of infant mortality. For example, in Costa Rica, a country renowned for its near-universal public health insurance program, the expansion of coverage was not responsible for the dramatic reduction in infant mortality in the 1970s. Indeed, McGuire argues that sometimes the expansion of health insurance and social security programs actually worked against getting public health services to the poorest. Especially in the Latin American countries with a tradition of strong labor movements, such as Chile and Argentina, health insurance programs often benefited the urban formal sectors but excluded the rural poor and other marginal populations. Union leaders sometimes even blocked plans that would have spread benefits out to poorer sectors.
Wealth, Health, and Democracy in East Asia and Latin America represents superb research on a vitally important topic: why some countries perform better than others on that most basic of development indicators, survival. The way economic performance, public policy, and political competition affect mortality outcomes is extraordinarily complex, as McGuire shows. But the most important policy implication is encouraging. East Asian–style economic growth isn’t necessary to attack infant mortality. The Latin American cases, in particular, demonstrate that relatively cheap and well-known public policy interventions work just as well.

Mary A. Clark
Tulane University